So why the psychoanalytic angle? As it happens, I don't believe that the impulse towards metaphysics has a psychoanalytic explanation. When I wrote the Metaphysics program, I did toy with the idea. There's something rather sexy about the thought that human beings are doomed to be metaphysical because of events in early infancy. However, I argued there that even if metaphysics did have a psychoanalytic explanation, that would not constitute a reduction of metaphysics to psychology, let alone an unmasking of metaphysics. There's no substitute for doing the dialectic.
Richard Wollheim has something provocative to say on this topic, in the last chapter of his book F.H. Bradley where he speculates that Bradley's motivation was Kleinian, the desire to recover 'whole objects'. But that's all it is: speculation. And, as I said, I don't believe it. I am more inclined to believe in a metaphysical basis for psychoanalysis.
There's a way to test Wollheim's theory. Find some asexual Martians who don't have breasts, penises, vaginas or anuses and see if they are capable of getting off on metaphysics. If they are, then then there has to be a different explanation than the one Klein would give. (Or Freud for that matter, assuming that there is a Freudian explanation.) As the chances of that are pretty remote, we need to find something more persuasive than, 'I don't believe it.' I'd like to have a shot at that, but not now.
Meanwhile, I've realized something else. When I wrote the stuff about the 'reality principle', I was looking for a way to generalize on the insights of Wittgenstein's argument against a private language. But it's obvious reading this now that I was thinking of the 'two world' theory all the time. The dialectic of the private language is addressed to the one asking the question. It vindicates the solipsist's question at the very same time as it refutes the solipsist's theory of a 'world of my possible experience'.