I'm assembling the pieces of a jig-saw puzzle. Don't assume that the order in which I write these paragraphs corresponds to some grand structure or plan. If I knew how the pieces fitted together I wouldn't be doing this.
But let's start with something which will be important in what follows. Early on in Pathways Metaphysics I raise the question of what is, or is not 'mundane'. All the sciences are by definition mundane. They deal with this world, this universe. If there is such a thing as metaphysics, per se, if it is not just another problem area for philosophical analysis (as contemporary philosophers take it to be, I'm not criticizing them for that) then there must be something, an aspect of reality in the broadest sense, that is not mundane.
But what could that be? Hegel's destructive critique of two-world metaphysical theories (in the section of Phenomenology of Mind entitled 'The Inverted World', see Tentative Answers, November 30 2010) seems to leave only one remaining option: what is not mundane, the proper object of metaphysical inquiry, is an aspect of the mundane world of which we are not normally aware, the world taken as a coherent whole, seen under the aspect of 'the Absolute'.
Well, that's one candidate. Another would be A.N. Whitehead's idea, in Process and Reality that the aim of metaphysics is to 'frame the best set of categories that we can'. In Whitehead's hands, this turns out to be something analogous to a grand 'Theory of Everything', except that Whitehead isn't doing science, his metaphysical account of 'actual occasions' would be consistent with any number of different physical theories.
And then, finally, there's Heidegger's ambitious project of 'phenomenological ontology' which seeks to analyse the essential structures of 'being in the world' or Dasein.
— On all three models, Hegel, Whitehead and Heidegger, there is nothing in reality that is not ultimately connected with the mundane. What would my view be?